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AN attempt to define the limits of the field of law and the prob-
lems within it, what are and should be the approaches to those
problems, and the data and methods for investigation must begin
with the activities and ways of thinking of the practitioner.
These have established the boundaries of the field and the mode
of its cultivation not only for the practitioner but also for those
with scientific curiosity.
There are many callings the professional activities of whose
practitioners are the advising of clients what, in a developing
situation, are the forms which the future behavior of others
are likely to take, and to what extent and how the course of
the situation's development may be affected so that the future
behavior in question may take the form preferred or least ob-
jectionable to the client. The profession of marketing or sales
adviser is one of them. It directs its attention to the forms of
behavior called buying. The profession of public relations coun-
sel is another. The behavior of press and platform and their
remote consequences in voting, buying and giving are its spe-
cialty. There are many others. Among them is the profession
of the lawyer. The lawyer advises as to the probable forms of
the judicial behavior of courts. His clients are those against
whom governmental intervention is sought, those who are seek-
ing intervention in their own behalf, and those with enough
foresight to wish to mold the present and the future in anticipa-
tion of the necessity of seeking or avoiding intervention in the
future.
The behavior of many different groups is the subject matter
of the advice of the public relations counsel to his client. Today,
when the problem is the limitation of the production of petroleum
the group is the producers of crude oil; tomorrow, when the
recognition of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is the
focus of the situation the group is the government; when a
president is being nominated and elected, his advice relates to
the intermediate behavior of almost every group in the com-
munity. So in the practice of the marketing expert one group
after another passes before him as he regards the likelihoods of
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the behavior of each. In one case he advises upon the sale of
yachts, in another second-hand cars, in a third lollypops. But
only one among the many groups in the community engages
the lawyer's professional attention. The likely behavior of judi-
cial officers of the government is the burden of his advice. Sel-
dom does he advise or assist in his client's contacts with the
discipline committee of a church or club or with the arbitra-
tions of a trade association. If he advises during his client's
business negotiations, only rarely does his advice include more
than a statement of what judicial behavior would be probable
were the negotiations to take this course or that.
The professional work of the marketing expert compels him
to take into account many factors besides the wares of his client
and their distribution, the argument in advertisements, and skill
in face to face contacts. For this reason he does not devise for
his clients plans for selling ice cream on Hudson River ferry-
boats during the winter nor for selling golf clubs to the blind.
Neither does he advise that slate roofing will be bought by
nomadic groups or that attempts to sell uniforms for army or
police in communities in which there is no organized govern-
ment will succeed. So the public relations counsel would -at pres-
ent hesitate to advise his client to adopt a plan for the election
of a negro to the office of Mayor of the City of New York. But
the lawyer's work is commonly done in but one region, the
outstanding elements of whose material and non-material cul-
ture appear to him to be relatively stable. He does not face the
problem of securing favorable decisions from Abyssinian tribu-
nals, from informal gatherings of Polynesian savages, as well
as from the courts of his own country. In formulating his ad-
vice, therefore, he passes over unnoticed most of the cultural
factors in his situations; and those which he does take into ac-
count are given no systematic consideration.
Like the practitioners of other professions, the lawyer has
invented saws, adages, proverbs, and maxims to guide him in
judging and advising how contacts with the courts will eventu-
ate. These saws and maxims have been elaborated into a bulky
professional literature which attempts to describe the way courts
behave in the great variety of situations in which the individual
is in contact with them. Thus on one side of its equations appears
the behavior of judicial officers.
On the other side appears the behavior of parties, their wit-
nesses, and counsel. Among all the variables present in Lis
situations, the lawyer has chosen the behavior of the parties
with which to equate the behavior of the courts. The obvious-
ness of the variability of the behavior of the parties and the
great significance which in his cultural inheritance is attributed
to the behavior of a human personality doubtless accounts for the
19321
YALE LAW JOURNAL
choice. Consequently the primary statements of the lawyer's
literature are written in the form of sequences of behavior. After
the parties behave in this manner the court behaves in that
manner.
These sequences are descriptions of the behavior of parties
and the behavior of courts in cases which have arisen in the
past. A few sequences are descriptions of the behavior in a
large group of very similar cases. But most of the situations
in which individuals come in contact with judicial officers pre-
sent eccentric behavior not only deviating from' the usual and
regular course but also deviating in its own peculiar manner
and degree. In order to avoid the unwieldy bundle of particulari-
ties which would result from according a separate description
to each of these situations, they are thrown into large groups
and the common factors of the behavior in each group abstracted
and a mere fragment of the behavior of the parties described.
But this course is by no means always followed. Often a sequence
is derived from one or a very few of these cases.
The sequences which are derived from a large group of very
similar cases the lawyer has incorporated in propositions in
which he ascribes a causal relation between the behavior of the
parties and the decision of the court. But he has not clearly
distinguished between causal relation attributed as a result of
observaon, causal relation hypothetically attributed because of
belief that observation would justify it, and causal relation at-
tributed because of faith in its existence. Consequently the se-
quences derived from one or a very few cases and those derived
from the large groups of situations in which the eccentric be-
havior of the parties is only more or less similar are also re-
garded as disclosing a causal relation between behavior of par-
ties and decision. Thus propositions which are verified hypothe-
ses and propositions which are unverified hypotheses are, with-
out distinction, regarded as rules of law which indicate not only
how a court has, does and will behave, but also how a court must
behave. Taken together these rules of law give a complete ac-
count of how a court decides in any -and every situation.
It will be noted that no mention is made of statutes, ordi-
nances, and regulations in describing how the lawyer derives
the sequences in his rules of law because they are not derived
from the models of behavior for parties, for court or for both
set forth in statutes, ordinances, and regulations. The traditional
attitude of the lawyer is that until these models have been re-
fined by courts the weight to be accorded them in accounting for
judicial behavior is too uncertain for them to be incorporated
in his rules of law. In consequence he has no systematic pro-
cedure for dealing with them.
In formulating his professional advice, however, the lawyer's
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rules of law are not his exclusive or even principal reliance. In
addition he takes into account every factor in the situation which
he can differentiate from its context and on the basis of them
and of his rules of law he makes an intuitional judgment of the
form which judicial behavior will take.
The activities of the lawyer have for the most part been
limited to advising how a court will act, viz., whether it will
intervene at all and if it does the model of behavior which will
be prescribed. This limitation has resulted in the lawyer only
casually observing whether or not the parties conform to the
model. He has not attempted a systematic study of the degree
by which the subsequent behavior of the parties conforms to the
model. Neither has his professional work required him to study
the effect, if any, of the form which the behavior of the parties
takes after the decision, upon the behavior of persons who are
not palties. Nor has it required him to observe and study the
effect of his rules of law and of decisions and statutes upon
the behavior of the community. In short, the study of judicial
behavior and of statutes as devices for social control or for any
purpose other than to aid in forecasting future judicial behavior
does not come within his province.
Such are the activities of the lawyer. They define and limit
the field of his profession. For them he is trained and in them
he acquires his special competence.
Some report should now be given of the lawyer's traditional
ways of thinking. He takes no account of the fact that intui-
tional judgments are the bases for his advice. On the contrary
his opinions are taken to be forecasts dictated by his rules of
law. His rules of law do not appear to be unverified hypotheses.
There is a failure to observe that the attribution in them of
causal relation between decisions and the behavior of the parties
is the product of either methodless empiricism or dogmatism.
Since rules of law are taken to state an established causal rela-
tion and are not seen as hypotheses, the problems for research
have appeared to be not the verification of rules of law but rather
their historicity, their logical consistency with one another and
their logical elaboration in postulate systems. For the same
reason in the teaching of law the objective is seen as the im-
parting of knowledge of decisions and of the rules which the
lawyer derives from them; the material, documents; and the
method, exegesis.
In this way of thinking a judicial officer of the government
appears to be a person without biological and cultural inheri-
tance whose behavior is not the product of the factors regarded
as significant in accounting for the behavior of human beings.
This person's behavior seems to be fully accounted for by the
law of the lawyer. Hence, the art or science of judicial be-
19321
YALE LAW JOURNAL
havior is a field of knowledge complete and self-sufficient, wholly
independent of all others and coordinate with them. It is in-
admissable to view hypothetically the behavior of a judicial
officer as a response given in an inclusive situation. It is un-
necessary in a study of such behavior to set up as a control a
study of the like behavior of other persons.
In this way of thinking no account has been taken of the fact
that in any situation which includes human behavior, past de-
cisions are only one among many factors; that in any situation,
whether or not decisions are one of the factors, it is a matter
of tentative choice what factors are attempted to be correlated;
that in choosing factors to be correlated there is no necessity
for selecting the two factors of judicial behavior and behavior
of parties; that any study which attempts to correlate but two
factors is unlikely to supply even an index; and that the correla-
tion of decisions and any other factor in the situation may
profitably be studied by statistical method.
Another aspect of the lawyer's way of thought must be stated.
He has come to share the layman's view that the lawyer's rules
of law and the decisions from which they are derived, as well
as statutes, are dominant factors in accounting for the behavior
of the community. He often refers to them as "law," thereby
implicitly attributing a causal relation between them and the
behavior of the community of the same sort that he attributes in
his rules of law between the behavior of parties and the decision
of a court. This manner of speaking has led him and others to
confuse lawyer's rules of law for the behavior of the court with
rules of "law" for the behavior of the community applicable to
every situation of daily life and regularly observed by everyone.
Such is the lawyer's traditional way of thinking of his prob-
lems, his data and his methods. To be sure it is grossly inade-
quate and filled with misleading notions. But for him it is a
by-product of his professional work, seriously regarded on cere-
monial occasions only, and never permitted to limit his field of
vision to less than the whole situation upon which he gives an
intuitional judgment. However, to the lawyer's rational account
can be attributed his failure to recognize that his judgments
are intuitional and given in inclusive situations of many biologi-
cal and cultural factors, his failure to attempt an analysis of the
process of his judgments and his failure even to begin system-
atically to take into account the factors in the situation.
II
When a lawyer advises his client of the probable form which,
under the circumstances, the decision of a trial or appellate
court will take, his forecast, it has already been observed, is an
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intuition of experience. This is equally true of forecasts as to
rulings upon motions, objections to evidence, instructions, etc.,
which the lawyer makes for his own guidance. In making his
forecast, he takes into account every factor in the situation
which he is able to differentiate, compares them with similar
factors in other situations which he has experienced, estimates
their similarities and dissimilarities, weights the results as best
he may, and integrates them in his judgment. Since the lawyer's
advice is a forecast of the probable form of judicial decision
in a developing, inclusive situation he should frankly recognize
that he is stating probabilities and adopt a method which pro-
vides for the systematic consideration of the factors in his situ-
ations and thus makes for the greatest available precision in
stating probabilities.
A judicial ruling or decision is an event. The event which is
the ruling should be diitinguished from the opinion and also
from the other concurring and following events, such as the
behavior of the litigants and of others subsequent to the de-
cision, which are thought of as its "consequences." Though the
events regarded as consequences are, more often than not, more
important than the ruling they are not events witlin the field
of law. Nor is the form of the opinion a matter of professional
forecasting.
The forecast of a particular event is a statement of the prob-
ability of its occurrence. A statement of the probability of its
future occurrence is based upon the frequency of its past con-
currence with other particular events. All the events in experi-
ence are conceived of as an inclusive situation organized with
reference to a critical particular event, the concurrence of
which with other events is the subject of inquiry. The number of
such inclusive situations is as great as the number of critical
events. Whatever the choice of critical events the problem of
forecasting the concurrence of events in any one inclusive situa-
tion is no different from the problem of forecasting the concur-
rence of events in any other. Thus the forecasting of a particu-
lar ruling is no different from the forecasting of any particular
event of behavior, as for example, the behavior of the discipline
committee of a club or the decision upon an application for ad-
mission to the Yale Law School. This is true despite the fact
that the ruling has official prestige and important consequences
and despite the common belief that particular rulings must and
do conform to statutes and prior decisions.
The statement of the probability of concurrence is the product
of observation and statistical method. It would be impossible
to observe the concurrence of the critical event with all the
events in an inclusive situation. Inevitably a limited number
of events is selected for observation. The selection is tentative
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and based upon the hypothesis that observation of the concur-
rence of the critical event with the selected events will indicate,
sufficiently for the purpose in hand, the probability of the con-
currence of the critical event under inquiry with all the events
in the inclusive situation.
If there are a sufficiently large number of situations in which
a critical event of the type selected for inquiry concurred
with events identical with or, according to some relevant stand-
ard, similar to the selected events in the situation in hand, it
may be possible by observing the frequency of each of the critical
events to state the probabilities as to the form of the critical
event in the situation at hand. For example, by observing the fre-
quency of each of the several forms of the critical events of
type E, i. e., E,- E,2 E,3 E,4 E,5 which have in other similar situ-
ations concurred with A,' B, 2 C,3 D,4 it may be possible to state
the probability that in the situation *at hand, in which the
selected events are also A,' B,2 C,3 D, 4 the precise form of the
critical event will be E. If in an idle moment it were imagined
that there were a sufficiently large number of situations organ-
ized with reference to each event of behavior which is supposed
to be regulated by the government and if it were further
imagined that there were estimates of the frequency of the con-
currence of each of the diverse forms of these events with each
combination of forms of the selected events, then one would be
conceiving the abstraction, a law regulating every event of be-
havior, and be imagining the actualization of the possibility of
its statement.
But the critical events in the form of which the lawyer is inter-
ested comprise, it has been observed, a much more limited group
than those in which the government is supposed to be interested.
His group of critical events is confined to the behavior of courts.
Lawyer's law, therefore, is much more limited than a law im-
agined to impinge upon everyone all the while. Among the
lawyer's situations or cases there may be some in which the
selected events are so similar in form to the events present in a
large group of similar situations, in all of which the critical
event is judicial behavior, to permit him to state the probabili-
ties of the form of the critical event in the situation in hand
from observation of the frequency of the concurrence of each
form of the critical event in those situations. Thus under car-
tain circumstances the lawyer is able to forecast the admission
to probate of a will, duly attested and executed by a decedent
who was of sound and disposing mind, or the entry of a default
judgment after the failure to answer a summons and complaint
within the prescribed time.
But in many instances, among the lawyer's cases, the situa-
tions in which the selected events are identical with or, accord-
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ing to some relevant standard, similar to the selected events in
the situation in hand and in which the critical event is judicial
behavior are so few in number that observation of the frequency
of the concurrence of each form of the critical event in those
situations will not indicate a useful probability of the form
which the critical event will take in the situation in hand. These
are the usual instances in which the case before the lawyer is
not foreclosed by a number of recent cases from his own juris-
diction. In dealing with such situations, therefore, he cannot
proceed by the method which has been abstracted for stating
probabilities of the form of the critical event but his procedure
must be a variation of that method. Since there will not be a
large enough number of situations like the situation in hand to
permit the making of a sufficiently useful statement of probabili-
ties, it will be necessary to include within the group situations
in which the forms of the selected events differ from those in
the situation in hand. It will no longer be possible to define the
group and thereby earmark the situations to be included in terms
of the form of the selected events. The situations within the
group are chosen as follows. From the possible alternative
forms of the prospective critical event in the situation in hand
are chosen, on the basis of experiential judgment, the several
forms which the critical event is likely to take. Any situation
in which there is actualized any one of these likely possibilities
is included. Since at least two likely possibilities will always
be present, the group will include situations in which there are
actualized at least two and perhaps more possibilities. It will
be noted, also, that such a grouping permits the inclusion of
situations having selected events differing in form from those
in other situations within the group as well as from those in the
situation in hand. On the basis of the similarity of the selected
events the situations thus included will be classified in subgroups.
Observation of the frequency of the actualization of each likely
possibility will thus require observation of its concurrence with
the selected events in each of the subgroups. Such observation
will disclose that there is, at most but one, if there be any, sub-
group of situations in which the selected events are identical
with or, with reference to a relevant standard, similar to the
selected events in the situation in hand. To enable the utiliza-
tion of the data as to the frequency of the concurrence of each
likely possibility with each combination of selected events, the
selected events in the situation in hand must, with reference to
some relevant standard, be compared with the selected events
in the situations in each of the subgroups to determine the de-
gree by which they deviate from each other.
The determination of the probabilities as to the form of the
critical event is thus the result of the integration of two steps:
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(1) observation of the frequency of concurrence of each likely
possibility with the various subgroupings of selected events and
(2) measurement of the degree of deviation between the selected
events in the situation in hand and those in the situations in the
various subgroupings. The probabilities are the function of two
variables, frequency of concurrence, and degree of deviation.
For example, assuming that E is the critical event, that E I and
E 2 indicate the likely forms of the critical event (but two forms
are supposed for the purpose of simplicity and not because it
is thought unlikely that there will be more than two), and that
A1BlC1D 2 describe the selected events in the situation in
hand. One of the events in each situation in the group will be
an event actualizing either E I or E 2. The selected events in
these situations may be A'B0 1D 1, A2B2C 2D1, A3BCD 2 or
any combination of them. Also as has been observed, El or
E2 may concur with any combination of selected events. The
frequency of such concurrence will have been noted. As a re-
sult there will be subgroups of situations in which the events
will be A'BC1 'Dl and either El or E2, A2 1BC 2DC2 and either
E' or E 2, A3B 3C3D3 and either El or E 2, etc. The selected
events, ABiC,.D2, in the situation at hand will successively
be compared with the selected events in each of the sub-
groups A'B 10CD 1, A2B2C 2D2, A-B3C3D3. The probable form of
the critical event in the situation at hand will thus appear as
a function of the degree by which AlB1 C0D2 deviate from
AlBICIDi and the frequency by which E. and E con-
cur with AlBiCiDi etc. Thus if A1B1C'Dz deviate but slightly
from AB''CDi and if El concurs with those events in almost
100% of the cases, there is a very high probability that the form
of the critical event in the situation at hand will be the model for
behavior which is actualized by El. Similarly if A1B'C0Dg
deviate very greatly from AXBiCiDi there is a very high prob-
ability that the form of the critical event in the situation at hand
will be a model which is not actualized by El.
This abstraction of a procedure enables one to conceive the
abstraction, lawyer's law, and to imagine the actualization of
the possibility of its statement.-
III
The lawyer's process of intuitional judgment is obviously a very
rough and haphazard approximation of a precise method de-
'An attempt to apply a method derived from this abstraction has been
reported in Moore and Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Appled
to the Debiting of Direct Discounts (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 381, 555, 752, 928,
1055 and 1219. It will be noted that in that attempt only two factors in
the situation were taken into account.
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rived from the procedure which has been abstracted and his
forecast a rough approximation of the result which would be
obtained by a special application of that method. Obviously
until special applications are accomplished, the roughest ap-
proximations are all that can be had. Were this all, it would
not be a matter of regret. But unfortunately the lawyer's failure
to see his problem as one of attempting to systematize and to
make methodical the processes implicit in his intuitional judg-
ments and his clinging to the traditional notion that his prob-
lem is one of systematizing statutes and decisions have com-
pletely blinded those with scientific curiosity to the direction
which the inquiries into judicial behavior should take. They
have also completely obscured the contribution which the lawyer
can make towards the solution of the problems posed by the
other arts, sciences and disciplines and the contribution which
they can make towards the solution of his problems.
In an attack made by a worker in one of the arts, sciences
or disciplines upon the problems which an inclusive situation
suggest to him the lawyer's contribution will of necessity be
within narrow limits. His contribution cannot extend beyond
the making of statements as to the form of judicial behavior.
He can forecast the model for behavior which the judgment of
the court will prescribe. He does not forecast whether the
judgment will be conformed to or, if it is, what the "conse-
quences" of conformity, partial conformity or nonconformity
will be. Within these limits he can contribute experience in
making intuitional judgments in situations more or less similar
to the situation under observation. In respect of methods for
correlating the form of judicial behavior with other events or
factors in the situation, he can contribute substantially nothing.
This seems to be as true of statutes and decisions as of the
many other factors.
The contribution of the lawyer in such an attack does not
include the making of statements of the likely forms of the
behavior of individuals in the community which will concur with
other selected events in situations, especially in those which in-
clude statutes and prior decisions. It is true, that in the process
of forecasting the probable forms of judicial behavior, he has
frequently had occasion to observe the concurrence of forms of
the behavior of individuals with various selected events which
include among them statutes and decisions. This experience
may give him a certain facility though his professional activities
have not practiced him in judging such likelihoods.
One who attempts to approach precise method in forecasting
the form of judicial behavior must seek the aid of workers in
many other fields of knowledge. Were he to attempt to forecast
the behavior of an individual in a situation which includes
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statutes and decisions this would be equally true. The events
in the situation which he selects and takes into account include
events which are the focus of study in anthropology, anthro-
pogeography, sociology, and psychology, psychiatry and perhaps
other biological sciences. In dealing with each of the selected
events, he must call upon those trained in the discipline which
focuses upon that particular event for the special knowledge
and techniques which they command. In the application of his
method he must rely upon the statistician.
It is implicit in what has been said that the problem presented
by an inclusive situation is a problem suggested by one of the
existing arts, sciences or disciplines. Until a problem has been
posed the situation is but amorphous and unorganized experi-
ence. Consequently a cooperative attack upon a situation made
by workers frommany fields cannot be an attack upon the situ-
ation, but must of necessity be an attack upon a problem set by
one of them and the cooperation of the others must be aimed
at the verification of his hypotheses.
